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T he collapse of Lehmann Brothers in mid-September 2008 had an enormous impact on the fi nancial markets and the global economy by undermining trust -trust in counterparties among banks and trust in the overall stability of the fi nancial system, but also citizens' trust in their institutions -systemic trustand the validity of the underlying principles. It is thus not surprising that re-establishing trust in the fi nancial system has become a key task for policymakers throughout Europe (and the USA). This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion of the impact of the fi nancial crisis on trust by presenting recent empirical results concerning the reaction to the crisis as refl ected in citizens' diminished levels of systemic trust. Within the paradigm of systemic trust, special attention is given to the confi dence invested in: i) political institutions at European and national level and ii) the free market economy.
The paper fi rst briefl y elaborates on the key role of systemic trust and cites some basic fi gures concerning public demand for more state intervention. Using time series data 1 from the public opinion monitoring unit of the European Commission (Eurobarometer), the consequences of the fi nancial crisis on public opinion vis-à-vis the three major European institutions: the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the European Parliament are then demonstrated. This is followed by an examination of the relationship between European and national institutions using time trend data on trust towards national governments and national parliaments from Eurobarometer and the 
The Key Role of Suffi cient Levels of Systemic Trust
Social scientists from all fi elds agree that a suffi cient level of trust, especially systemic or institutional trust, plays a crucial part in the stability and maintenance of the social, political and economic system. When trust breaks down, the social system is threatened with unrest, the democratic legitimacy of the political system is endangered and the legitimacy of the market-based economy is called into question. The latter should be mentioned in particular. Citizens' loss of confi dence in a market-based economy is often expressed in one of two ways. They pressure the government either to abolish the free-market system altogether or to intervene more heavily in the system. The likelihood of the fi rst scenario materialising is rather small, as polls taken in the world's largest economies indicate that a majority of citizens are still content with a market-based economy. In some economies, however, notably Germany, anti-capitalist sentiments are grow- from mid-October 2008, 81% of Italian, 70% of German, 68% of French and 59% of British respondents support increased regulation by their governments of businesses' activities. Citizens had expressed strong fears about globalisation even before the fi nancial crisis. A GlobeScan survey 6 conducted shortly before the fi nancial crisis erupted indicated that a majority (72%) of respondents in 23 countries were in favour of measures to protect jobs and national industries, and 63% overall favoured restricting foreign ownership of national companies. And according to an FT/Harris Poll 7 in March 2009, already more US citizens tend to agree (30%) than to disagree (24%) that national protectionism is the correct instrument to end the economic recession.
Evidence from Eurobarometer
One of the crucial research questions emerging from the ongoing crisis is how strongly the crisis is affecting European citizens' level of confi dence in various The two last observations in Figure 1 were gathered after the fi nancial crisis. Interestingly, in the au-8 In order to control for the signifi cant variations in the "Don't know" answers, net trust values are given in this paper when using EB data. "Net trust" here looks only at those respondents who have an opinin and subtracts the percentage of those who say they do not have trust from those who say they have trust in the system. Thus a value above zero indicates that overall there are more people who trust than distrust and a value below zero indicates that the majority of people distrust. 9 The question of confi dence in the ECB is really only relevant in the case of those countries that have implemented the euro. Therefore, only data from the euro area member states (EA12) have been used. However, the results do not differ signifi cantly when using an EU15 or EU27 country sample. As the time trend from 1999-2009 is of primary importance in Figure 1 , the four new countries Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia that joined the euro area recently have not been included in constructing the average. , one month after the fi nancial crisis fi rst hit, the erosion of European citizens' confi dence levels in the ECB was still rather modest, whereas by JanuaryFebruary 2009 (Standard EB 71) 11 , the decline in confidence in the ECB reached a historically low level in the EU27.
12 For the fi rst time since the creation of the ECB, more European citizens tend to mistrust the ECB than to trust it. One has to underline here that the ECB is directly relevant for the citizens in the EA12 countries, as their national central banks have given up their autonomy to this institution. We now have to wait for the results of the Standard EB 72 to know if this trend will continue as sharply as in the interval between Standard EB70 (October-November 2008) and Standard EB71 (January-February 2009) or whether it comes to a halt. One last remark on the interpretation of the data is necessary. The actual confi dence level in the ECB with a net value of -1% is still higher than the confidence levels in national governments and parliaments with net values ranging from -27% to -24%.
To analyse whether this trend is also applicable to other European institutions, Figure 2 shows the trend in net confi dence towards the European Commission. Although the decrease in confi dence towards this in- stitution has not been as signifi cant as that towards the ECB, it clearly supports the argument that there is a general decrease in citizens' confi dence regarding the European institutions since the fi nancial crisis in mid-September 2008. More concretely, the decrease in October-November 2008 was followed by a stronger decrease in the confi dence levels in January-February 2009 for the EU27. In contrast to the results discussed above, the levels of confi dence in the European Commission are still slightly higher than those in the ECB. However, citizens' confi dence has reached the same low level as it did in spring 1999 and might reach its lowest confi dence level in autumn 2009, once the data from the next Standard Eurobarometer can be evaluated. Again one should note that these confi dence levels are still signifi cantly higher than the confi dence expressed in the national governments.
To get the full picture of the trends in confi dence levels towards the European institutions, Figure 3 shows net confi dence levels in the European Parliament for the last decade. In a similar pattern to that observed with the ECB, the confi dence level in the EP has reached a historical low with a net trust value of 8% in January-February 2009 on the part of the EU27.
Confi dence in National Governments
The interesting question that now arises is whether this strong decrease in confi dence levels in European institutions is accompanied by a similar pattern of declining confi dence in national institutions.
Two different sources of data are utilised to answer this question. One source is the set of time trend data 
Figure 3 Net Trust in the European Parliament in the EU15 (EU27), 1999-2009
taken from the Edelman Trust Barometers. 13 Respondents were asked how much they trusted the government to do what is right. Figure 4 shows the average time trend for the fi ve European countries Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. According to the Edelman Trust Barometers trust in national government actually increased from 2008 -before the fi nancial crisis -to November-December 2008 -after the fi nancial crisis. In particular, the increases in Germany (from 27% to 35%) and the increases in the United Kingdom (from 34% to 41%) in confi dence in the government were rather strong. This phenomenon is not precisely new as empirical evidence suggests that trust in the national government appears to increase after the occurrence of a national crisis. This could already be observed after the attacks on the United States in September 2001.
14 In times of severe crisis, citizens' confi dence towards their national institutions seems to increase. However, it should be noted that, in contrast to the experiences of the fi ve big European economies, there were signifi cant decreases in levels of public trust, from 39% before to 30% after the crisis, in the United States. 13 Data from the 2004 to 2009 period are provided by the Edelman Trust Barometer reports which can be downloaded at http://www. edelman.co.uk/trustbarometer. Unlike the Eurobarometer surveys, the Edelman Trust Barometer surveys are not based on a representative sample of the population but are purposely constructed to monitor opinions of "elites". Therefore, the Edelman Trust Barometer population is college-educated and reports a household income in the top quartile of their country.
14 V. C h a n l e y : Trust in the Aftermath of 9/11: Determinants and Consequences, Political Psychology, Vol. 23, No. 3, . Although the September 11 attacks were not of an economic character, but rather were general attacks on the USA, these fi gures might nevertheless give some indication of the trend in government confi dence in the aftermath of national crisis.
Thus, the Edelman data suggest that the trend seems to be diametrically opposed to confi dence towards the European institutions. But is this trend supported by evidence from Eurobarometer? Recent data from Eurobarometer seem to support an inverse relationship between confi dence in European institutions and national institutions. The best analysis for testing the assumption is to compare the same institution, in this case the parliament, on a European and national level. Thus Figure 5 shows the time trend data from Eurobarometer from 2001 to 2008 15 for citizens' net confi dence in national parliaments. Similarly to the Edelman data, one can observe an increase in confidence in the EU27 in the national parliaments after the fi nancial crisis in October-November 2008.
But does this relationship also hold for confi dence in other national institutions? Also utilising Eurobarometer data, Figure 6 plots data showing trends in confidence in national governments. In examining the time trend data on confi dence in national governments from 2001-08, shown in Figure 6 , one detects a signifi cant increase in the EU27. Thus data from both the Eurobarometer surveys and the Edelman Trust Barometer support a diametrically opposed trend between citizens' confi dence towards European and national institutions after the fi nancial crisis. The data sets of the upcoming standard Eurobarometers 71 and 72 have to be examined once they are available to shed more light on the confi dence trend towards national institutions.
Confi dence in the Market Economy
A certain level of citizens' confi dence in marketbased economies is crucial for the maintenance of social peace and the stability of the economic system. It guarantees citizens' support of an economic system in which the means of production are privately owned and operated for profi t through free market mechanisms. According to the results of an FT-Harris poll, as depicted in Figure 7 , the level of confi dence towards capitalistic free market economies is distributed differently throughout the different European countries and the USA. When asked in October, directly after the beginning of the fi nancial crisis, whether the current fi nancial crisis had been caused more by "abuses of capitalism" or by the "failure of capitalism itself", an astonishing 30% of German respondents selected the latter explanation. This value is four times higher than the 7% obtained in the USA and nearly twice as high as that obtained in France, at 17%. These strong German anti-capitalist sentiments are accompanied by a signifi cant increase in discontent expressed by German citizens with the concept of a social market economy. Figure 8 shows the German trend data 16 towards trust in the social market economy. From 2003 until November 2008, there was a signifi cantly steady increase in the number of German citizens who thought that the social market economy was unjust, from 34% to 49%. This increase in German citizens' discontent 16 Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, op. cit.
with the social market economy is also supported by time trend data and a poll conducted by the Bertelsmann Stiftung 17 in May 2008, which found that 73% of German citizens evaluated the income distribution in Germany as unfair. Similarly, according to the WIN Crisis Index 18 conducted in January 2009, German citizens have one of the lowest confi dence levels towards banks, stock markets and their government compared to other G20 countries. However, these results could merely refl ect the fact that the German economy has been hit the hardest among the world's largest economies by the fi nancial crisis with an expected decrease of economic growth by a staggering 6%. Thus German citizens might have been aware of this fact from the earliest stages of the fi nancial crisis.
Conclusion
As could be presumed, the fi nancial crisis had a signifi cant impact on the levels of trust that citizens place in the system and its institutions. Recent data show a signifi cant fall in the confi dence of European citizens' in the EU's institutions. This sharp decline of confi dence can be best observed in the case of the European Central Bank. For the fi rst time since its creation, a majority of European citizens no longer trusts the ECB. 
INSTITUTIONS/TRANSPARENCY
However, the signifi cant decrease in European citizens' confi dence in the two other European institutions -the European Commission and the European Parliament -is not replicated at the national level. Two independent data sources highlight that confi dence levels in national governments have actually risen, supporting a contrasting trend between the confidence in European and in national institutions. It remains to be seen whether or not this fi rst indication points towards a new trend of re-nationalisation. It can clearly be observed that the level of trust in the European institutions remains much higher than that for national institutions, but the advantage enjoyed by "Europe" has been signifi cantly reduced.
This decrease in confi dence towards the ECB is fl anked in the case of Germany by strong anti-capitalist sentiments and a sharp decline in support for the social market economy, with 30% of Germans identifying the current fi nancial crisis as a failure of capitalism and around 50% characterising the social market economy as unjust, compared to around 35% who still identify it as just. We now have to wait for the release of the forthcoming data from Standard Eurobarometers 71 and 72, which will further help to evaluate more precisely the effects of the fi nancial crisis on levels of systemic trust towards European and national institutions. 
